'Nother Solent

"Ever wondered what our schools are teaching children about terrorism?"

Mick Hume asks in the Times.

To judge by some of the material in an education pack being used in my London borough, the questions might include: could al-Qaeda poison your burger? Did the American Government stage the September 11 attacks? And what lessons for the Middle East can you learn from arguing with your mum?

Hume writes that this story was first reported by the Walthamstow Guardian.

When the Walthamstow Guardian asked if the 9/11 attacks should be used as a teaching tool, one educationist said the pack was not about “preaching” to children, but about providing “impartial and unbiased information” and “letting them make sense of it”.

That would be information such as: “The terrorists had shown that, despite America’s size and military power, careful planning and complete faith could defeat them.”

So al-Qaeda defeated America. Or did it? After all, according to this impartial pack, “it is not known whether Flight 93 was taken over by passengers or shot down by the military”. The only people to whom this should be “not known” are conspiracy theorists. You might as well tell kids it is not known whether men really landed on the Moon.

From Hume's article I had the impression that the Walthamstow Guardian had expressed concern about the contents of the pack. However if this is the story Hume saw, I was wrong. It is almost as bland as this press release covering the launch of the pack.

There is one oddly defensive sentence in the press release, "The images used are those that have been published in reputable newspapers and magazines." Another oddity turns up at the end of Naomi Wright's article for the Walthamstow Guardian. The last sentence says, "Ms Wilson said the design on the front of the pack had been changed to the current picture shortly before the packs were printed." The oddity about this is not the words themselves, but the way this sentence is stuck on the end with nothing leading up to it. If I were not the idle wastrel that I am, I would go sniffing around for some earlier controversy about a picture used in the pack.

Nigel Sedgwick writes on ID cards

:

I'd like to support you in parts, but not all, of your posting.

Rob Hinkley's comment is a delight: "It seems strange that the government resisted the disclosure request: you'd have thought that if they had nothing to hide they'd have nothing to fear."

Given the recent track record of the UK Government, one must also be concerned that "the scheme will be hugely expensive". However, not all IT systems introduced by the Government have been disasters at first; several have also been OK at the second or third attempt. The underlying problem is, rather too often, that the Government does not really know what it wants or the extent to which that is practical; and "[critics] have questioned what benefits it will bring". On this, some of my thoughts can be found at Presentation on Technical Aspects of the National Identity Card.

Concerning improving the Parliamentary bill on the balance between civil liberties and utility (through an improved service of identification to the public, business and government), suggestions can be found on Samizdata comment on 30 March at 10:39 AM.

We then move on from cost-effectiveness to your own particular point: "... weighing cost versus benefit is only half the story".

I'm not keen on this sort of approach. Whether we admit it or not, when we make a decision, we do end up balancing apples against pears according to some weighting, stated or implicit.

The Scotsman article remembers Dame Stella Rimington, from last November. However, I recollect being certain that she was wrong on the major issue of ease of forging of ID Cards, as I told the BBC.

Baroness Park claims two things.

Firstly: "The very creation of such an enormous national identity register will be a present to terrorists; it will be a splendid thing for them to disrupt and blow up, ..."

Now there are a great many databases that are prime targets for terrorists, and also many potential targets that are not databases. It's not possible to protect them all, beyond any possible vulnerability. Accordingly, the adding of one more to the large set possible targets is not (or is barely) relevant. Furthermore, databases are relatively easy to protect (by replication and backup). Nowadays, this is always done for critical infrastructure, by government and by large businesses (eg banks and insurance). I see this issue as little more than scare-mongering, even if that was not the intention.

Secondly, Baroness Park claims: "It will also provide valuable information to organised crime and to the intelligence services of unfriendly countries. It will be accessible to all of these, ..."

There is a risk. However, the damage from exposure is not quantified. Perhaps it could be explained why and to what extent access is more damaging than to telephone directories, the electoral register, Passport Office and Inland Revenue records, etc. Also, perhaps it could be explained why and to what extent the risk is greater with the National Identity Register (NIR) than with these other things, including those that we currently use to identify ourselves.

In my above-referenced technical presentation, these risks (an others deserving more concern) are identified. They exist; they matter; they do not strike me as making anywhere near an overwhelming case against the NIR.

Two things I argue are important:

- to provide improved certification of (a single or known multiple) identity, for each citizen/resident to use as and when they choose, to confirm their identity to business and government and other individuals, if this can be shown to be cost-effective (and it will be later if not now);

- to prevent, by the Government and others, unnecessary invasion of personal privacy and prevent reduction in other civil liberties, to the maximum extent consistent with the valid and useful functionality of a National Identity Scheme.

I hope all this is of some interest and use.

Best regards
--
Nigel C Sedgwick

ID cards: government hypocrisy and irresponsibility.

Rob Hinkley makes the definitive comment on the government's reluctance to disclose its deliberations on the ID card project.

The BBC story Rob links to says, "Critics of the controversial identity cards say the scheme will be hugely expensive and have questioned what benefits it will bring." Those who criticise the scheme on grounds of cost make a fair point. Cost overruns on government projects, particularly technology projects, are so notorious that when I reached the scene in Ark Angel where Nikolei Drevin tells the captured Alex Rider all about his dreadful plans, and breaks off to moan about how collaboration with the British government on a hi-tech project has nearly exhausted even his billions, I found myself almost hoping that Alex would offer the poor chap a Kleenex and an apology.

However, we were talking about the government's plan to introduce ID cards, not the schemes of villains...

I take your point. I'll try that again. When talking about the government's plan to introduce ID cards, weighing cost versus benefit is only half the story.

My old college principal, Daphne Park, is not asking where the final benefits will fall on a scale starting at zero. She thinks that the ID card scheme will do actual harm to national security. My reasons for thinking that she ought to be listened to on this issue are not limited to the fact that I have drunk of her sherry.

A NATIONAL identity card scheme will be a "present" to terrorists, criminal gangs and foreign spies, one of Britain's most respected former intelligence agents has told ministers.

The warning from Daphne Park, who served for 30 years as a senior controller for MI6, the Secret Intelligence Service, came as the parliamentary power struggle over the identity cards bill dragged on.

And

Baroness Park, who was made a peer by Margaret Thatcher, passed a withering verdict on the proposed cards, ridiculing ministers' suggestions that the system will make people safer. In fact, she said, the complete opposite is true.

"The very creation of such an enormous national identity register will be a present to terrorists; it will be a splendid thing for them to disrupt and blow up," she said.

"It will also provide valuable information to organised crime and to the intelligence services of unfriendly countries. It will be accessible to all of these," she said.